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court which in the Mitchell case had interpreted the McNabh case decision of the Supreme Court as requiring a nullification of an otherwise
voluntary confession whenever illegal detention was involved. In the
Boone case. the defendant was arrested about 9 o'clock on a Saturday
morning, placed in a police showup about 11 oclock. at which time he
was identified by his robbery victim, and then for about twenty minutes
he -was questioned by the arresting officer. He was also again questioned
about 5 o'clock that afternoon for twenty or twenty-five minutes, and
later, between 9 and 10 p.m. the defendant requested to talk to the arresting officer and confessed his guilt on that occasion. The next day
(Sunday), at about 1 p.m.. the defendant surrendered to the same officer the money proceeds of the robbery. which the defendant had concealed in his shoe. Defendant was not arraigned until Tuesday morning.
At his trial he denied making the confession. He was convicted and
upon appeal his counsel contended that the illegal detention rendered
the otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible in evidence. The Court
of Appeals. in sustaining the trial court's ruling in admitting the confession, said: "Counsel's interpretation of the McNabb case accords with
the view taken by us of that case in our later decision in the Mitchell
case. But on appeal to the Supreme Court our view was rejected and
the Supreme Court itself interpreted its language in the 3McNabb case
wholly contrary to the position now taken by counsel for appellant in
this case. In the Mitchell case the Supreme Court said, as it had said
in the McNabb case, that inexcusable detention for the purpose of extracting evidence from the accused is both wrong and unlawful, but
pointed out that while this is true, detention, standing alone, does not
-affect the admissibilty of the confession except- where it appears that
4.he disclosure is induced by it. In short, that unlawful detention, without more, does not require rejection of a confession otherwise admissible
and that is this ease. ' Is

PrE A. -DAMMAN N

Recent Decisions on the Right of Federal Law Enforcement
Officers to Search without Warrant
Search of a Fixed Residence
On the crucial question of what latitude to allow federal agents in
searching private living quarters or places of business without having
obtained beforehand a search warrant with all its attendant constitutional safeguards, 1 the United States Supreme Court seems irreconcilably divided. In the last few years the Court, led by the justices who
favor a narrower construction of the demands of the Fourth Amendment, has rendered several important decisions which look toward a contraction of the broad scope of constitutional immunity which had been
hewn out by an earlier Court during the two decades following the First
'For a detailed discussion of the delayed arraignment (McNabb case) rule, see
Inbau, op. cit. supra note 3 at pp. 162-169.
'U.S. Coast. Amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be sei:ed." 1Emphasis supplied by the author.)
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World War. The gist of these decisions was that if an arrest was validly
made on, or closely by, the premises to be searched, the officers, if in
good faith seeking the "fruits or instrumentalities" of the crime
charged, could search among the papers and effects of the accused and
seize any matter which would have been the proper object of a search
warrant. 2 The vigorous objections of the then minority justices to the
alleged inroads being made on the citizen's right of privacy rose to a
high pitch in the Harris case, where a divided Court approved the seizure of altered draft cards as "reasonably incident" to an arrest3 for
check forgery after a five hour search of the defendant's apartment.
The opinion in the Johnson case, handed down in February of this
year, appears to reflect a marked return to the philosophy of the preWorld War II decisions, and it is to be noted that the dissenting justices
4
of the decisions alluded to above are now on the majority side. Superand
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nature of a search incident to an arrest, for the Court holds that a valid
arrest never took place and thus is not constrained to discuss these decisions. The facts briefly were these: Narcotic agents, on the basis of
opium fumes issuing from a transom of a hotel room and without having
previously acquired a search warrant, forced their way into the room
under color of authority, arrested the defendant, and subsequently uncovered and seized a quantity of opium and a pipe. On the basis of this
evidence the Government obtained a conviction and an affirmance in the
Circuit Court of Appeals. 5 The Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Jackson reversed, holding both the arrest and search unlawful.
The rule of police conduct to be gained from the opinion is strikingly
like that which was imposed on federal officials in the Prohibition Era
decisions 6 and is broad enough if liberally interpreted to have invalidated the searches condoned by the other faction of the Court in the pre7
ceding search and seizure cases in'which they held the upper hand.
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change in the situation of the suspect during the time necessary to secure a search warrant, the federal officers must present their evidence
to a "disinterested magistrate" and have him resolve the conflicting
interests involved. Though the evidence of criminal activity which was
possessed by the officers prior to search was sufficient "probable cause"
(search of gas station for illegally
2 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1945)
held ration coupons after arrest of owper without warrant; upheld in five to three
decision); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1945) (seizure of cancelled check
in office of war contractor by F.B.I. men auditing the books of defendant; no warrant; conviction affirmed). Note (1947) 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 413.
' Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); t tensively discussed in a recent
issue of this journal, note (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 244.

' Johnson v. United States, - U.S. -, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948). Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Black, Reed, and Burton registered their dissents without filing a dis.
senting opinion.
5162 F. (2d) 562 (C. C. A. 9th, 1947). The Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the tracing of the smell of opium to defendant's room by the three officers gave them
probable cause for the arrest, and that the search was a reasonable incident chereto.

"We venture to say that the smell of opium fumes may in some circumstances be
second only to the well-known maxim that 'Seeing is believing.' " Id. at 563.
'Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (search of defendant's garage on
the basis of alcoholic odors issuing therefrom; held illegal); see United States v.
Leftkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
7It

is precisely the same rule that Mr. Justice Jackson urged unsuccessfully in

Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 195 (1947), supra note 3.
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to support a warrant, it was not, and presumably no amount could be,
sufficient to justify the invasion of individual privacy without a warrant. Although the four dissenting justices wrote no opinions it seems
plain that they disagreed with the majority over the legality of the arrest. Their contention would doubtless he that after the defendant
opened the door under command, "reasonable cause". existed for be8
lieving the occupant guilty of a felony. But according to the majority
of the Court it will not do "to justify the arrest by the search (which
began with the initial intrusion) and at the same time justify the search
by the arrest.9 "
Search of an Automobile
The search without warrant of an automobile has always been thought
to stand on a different footing from that of a fixed residence or place of
business. Because of the mobile nature of the vehicle it was considered
unreasonable to require enforcement officers to bother going to the
magistrate first. If probable cause existed that the vehicle to be searched
contained contraband, the officers were generally allowed by the courts
to stop the vehicle, search it, and if forbidden matter were in fact uncovered, the vehicle could be lawfully seized and the driver arrested on
the basis of the discovery. 10 This rule of necessity was ushered in during
the Prohibition Era when the automobile was the chief instrumentality
for wholesale violations of the Liquor Law, and Congress had given this
summary form of search its express sanction in the Stanley Amendment.'1 The recent case of United States v. Di Re.' 2 however, cast some
doubt on the power of federal officers to search an automobile without
express Congressional authorization. Di Re was prosecuted for the possession of counterfeit gasoline coupons in violation of emergency price
control legislation, which, unlike the prohibition statutes, contained no
authorization for search of a vehicle without a warrant. Remarking that
the power to search an automobile without a warrant was held to be
constitutionally permissible in the earlier cases under the prohibition acts
because of the strong presumption of validity which attaches to Congressional legislation, Mr. Justice Jackson in the Di Re case pointed out
that Congress in no other statutes had recognized this poier in enforcement officials. Whether an officer would have power to stop and search
an automobile in absence of statutory authority -was not, however, decided in the Di Re case; for the Court held that even if the officers had
grounds for searching the automobile in which Di Re was riding, they
8This is the law of the state (Washington) where the arrest took place. State v.
Robbins, 25 Wash. (2d) 110, 169 P. (2d) 246 (1946). State law determines the
validity of arrests without warrant. United States v. Di Re, - U.S. -, 68 S. Ct.
222 (1948), infra note 12.
"But of. McDonald v. United States, No. 9524 (App. D.C., 1948) (officers observed defendant engaging in a misdemeanor by peering through transom of his
room; sight held not to be a "search" within meaning of the constitution; court
sdid that while conduct of officers was "not gentlemanly" it did not constitute a
denial of defendant's constitutional rights).
"0Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1930). But of. state cases collected in note (1947) 38 J. Crn. L. &
Criminology 239.
1141 Stat. 315 (1919), 27 U.S.C.A. §40 (1927).
-- U.S. -, 68 S.Ct. 222 (1948), Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Black dissenting.
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could not incidentally search the persons of the passengers in the car 13
A subsidiary point decided in the case is the re-affirmation of the rule
that state law is determinative of the validity of the arrest by federal
officers.
The point mooted but not decided in the Di Re case-whether an automobile may be stopped and searched without a warrant where there
is a suspected violation of a federal statute which does not expressly
authorize this practice-was the precise point in issue in a case recently
determined in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.' 4 The seizure
therein was of liquor being transported in violation of the Internal Revenue Code, which likewise contains no express provisions covering the
search of automobiles, and the action was one for forfeiture of the "offending" automobile. 15 The court, while aware of the shadow which the
Supreme Court had cast upon the constitutionality of the practice, upheld the search and seizure without warrant after it had ascertained
that probable cause existed prior to the search. The decision is based
largely on dicta in the prohibition cases l and a 1938 decision of doubtful authority where elements of waiver were present.'1 It seems likely
that the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court.
W. P. HILL

1 This upon the analogy that one executing a warrant
to search a house may
not incidentally search the persons of the occupants if they are not under arrest.
Cf. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
" United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, Etc., No. 9352 (C.C.A.
7th, 1948).
"-53 Stat. 410 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §3321 (b) (1) (3) (1940).
"Case cited supra note 10.
" Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938).
(driver of automobile not only
admitted probable guilt but invited the officer to examine contents of the trunk).

